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security community would agree that a security architecture is only as strong as its weakest link. However, they usually cannot agree on what that is, and no expert risks making a definite statement about it.
We can argue that a security strategy's weakest component will vary from one organization to another but perhaps we should compare past perceptions of what a weakest link is to what it could well be in the near future.
The weakest link timeline
A retrospective look at information technologies, information security trends, and threat models provides a few good guesses as to what the weakest links were in previous decades.
The mainframe
The mainframe and early timesharing systems of the 1960s and 1970s had stringent mechanisms to enforce security at the operating system level. When coupled with physical access controls and security clearance requirements, these mechanisms presented a substantial barrier to opportunistic attackers or internal attack threats. Substantial research efforts in secure operating systems design and security mechanisms subversion, 1,2 results of penetration-testing exercises, 3, 4 and the emergence of securityoriented subsystems such as IBM's Resource Access Control Facility and Computer Associates' ACF-2 and Top Secret (software packages that manage and enforce access control restrictions to mainframe resources) indicate that the primary security concern was internal operating system security. Therefore, the weakest link could be defined as flaws in an operating system's security controls or as procedural weaknesses in its development and deployment process. As Roger Schell, Peter Downey, and Gerald Popek outline in Preliminary Notes on the Design of Secure Military Computer Systems:
"Most contemporary shared computer systems are not secure because security was not a mandatory requirement of the initial hardware and software design. The military has reasonably effective physical, communication, and personnel security, so that the nub of our computer security problem is the information access controls in the operating system and supporting hardware." 5 Successful exploitation of a mainframe assumed a both technically and financially resourceful attacker who could access the computing facilities and had extensive knowledge of operating system internals and the technical expertise to develop complex attacks. The military, government, and large educational and research organizations of the '60s and '70s, as main users of mainframes and timesharing systems, could easily associate the attackers' profile to their IT infrastructure. In this way, they could focus their effort in preventing security breaches from determined intruders with access to the operating system either as legitimate users or through procedural flaws in the operating system development and deployment process.
The personal computer
During the '80s, extensive deployment of PCs in companies and households not only revolutionized the work and leisure time of a new range of computer users, but also presented a new security problem: the computer virus.
While mainframes and Unix systems continued to present challenges related to the traditional '70s approach to operating systems' security, the growing number of PCs were completely open to a new form of attack because of the lack of security controls in hardware and software. The computer virus 6 information security market as antivirus companies-and the principal security concern of any PC user.
Researchers considered the computer virus a minor threat because it only affected isolated computers with limited spreading capabilities due to the spread mechanism's low bandwidth and, in general, they deemed virus infection to be an implausible method for directly attacking specific targets.
However, with the introduction of hard-disk technology in the early '80s and the usage of floppy disks to transfer information between computers, the virus threat became more evident and incidents multiplied rapidly. A virus could infect files stored in the hard disk, make itself a persistent problem, and spread through files exchanged in floppy disks between otherwise isolated PCs. By the end of the '80s and into the early '90s, researchers identified the desktop computer and its susceptibility to computer viruses 7, 8 as the weakest link, and extensively documented and analyzed numerous accounts of newly discovered viruses and virus infection incidents. 9 
The networked organization
In the 1990s, the security community focused its attention on network security. The interconnecting of multiple networks via a set of Internet protocol standards and the sudden realization that research, academic, and government and military organizations' networks (which until then were somewhat isolated from untrusted users) were open to attack demanded additional measures beyond traditional operating system security. Servers, not workstations, were the crown jewels to protect, but efficient control of interconnected servers was not enough to prevent external attackers from breaching security. The firewall emerged as the de facto security device that separated friends (internal, controlled networks) from foes (all others on the outside) and effectively "sealed" the perimeter, the newly identified weakest link.
Extensive study of the security of networking protocols and infrastructure components identified new security problems such as security design flaws in the Internet protocols, weak user authentication systems, and buffer overflow conditions in the most common publicly accessible network services and proposed new solutions. Meanwhile, the use of LANs to connect PCs (which were previously isolated) to internal corporate networks (which were protected only at the perimeter), highlighted a problem that became evident by the mid '90s with the full adoption of the World Wide Web and the Internet as a means to conduct daily business.
In short, by the end of the decade, the weakest link became a moving target. While still struggling to secure the perimeter and server systems with solutions such as firewalls, cryptographically strong authentication systems, network and host-based intrusion detection systems, VPN devices, and cryptography additions to networking protocols, organizations then faced a new threat-a blurring perimeter that made it almost impossible to differentiate friends from foes and internal users from external attackers and vice versa.
The community's immediate reaction to the threat called for increased attention to server security, operating system controls, patch management, and additional peri-meter defenses, not only to protect the organization from external attacks but also to detect and react to incidents. Information security-both as a practical discipline and as an academic field-has steadily increased in complexity since the 1950s. A wider range of problems must now be considered to devise effective security architectures for today's organizations. Security solutions should account for our IT infrastructure's technological challenges and the particular aspects of human and organizational behavior. It is in this context that we can identify our current weakest link: the workstation. Efforts to implement and monitor workstation security during the 1990s are negligible compared to the immense resource allocation attempting to protect internal and external servers, network devices, and the network perimeter today. Once the community dealt with the virus threat in the 1980s (unsuccessfully, we might add), interest in workstation security evaporated when desktop operating systems began incorporating basic security mechanisms that made them suitable to operate in a networked environment, such as centralized user authentication and access control facilities. But by 2000, new ways of conducting business and new technologies had directly affected activities performed at the workstation; subsequently, a dormant set of security issues surfaced.
Extensive Web browser usage, instant messaging, email client software, peer-to-peer networking, digital media players, and a wide range of software packages that interact directly or indirectly with internal networks and the Internet are an information security officers' nightmares. To effectively mitigate risk, the security officer now must to identify vulnerabilities and assess their impact in a large set of software packages from multiple vendors ranging from small to large software companies, in-house development teams, and third-party integrators with various degrees of maturity in their development process, technical support infrastructure, and response time to provide security fixes. To make things even worse, the security officer often does not directly control the deployment of these packages or the operation of workstations. Additionally, the complex task of managing security patches and security policies across thousands of workstations (possibly with different configurations) as opposed to hundreds of servers with standardized configurations introduces severe scalability considerations that companies must account for to achieve a minimally successful information security strategy.
Perhaps it is evident that the workstation is the most vulnerable component in a threat model focused on protecting an organization from inside attacks, but proposing it as the security architecture's weakest link and presenting it as the new target in attack trends for the future requires demonstration that external attackers also view it as such.
Several indicators point to the workstation being the new weakest link.
The human factor
An organization's IT assets are ultimately managed and operated by humans, and an IT asset's management and operational roles typically are not assigned to the same individual. Generally, those who have the most security training in the organization manage and operate security infrastructure components. IT staff with various degrees of expertise manage and operate internal and publicly accessible servers as well as mission-critical applications, and are tasked to maintain and enforce an organization's information security policy.
At the end of the line comes managing workstations and workstation security. Although this responsibility hopefully falls with IT staff, usually it falls to end users-perhaps the least trained, experienced, or securityaware individuals in an organization. Therefore, desktop operating systems and the individuals operating them become the most obvious vulnerable avenues of attack for internal and external threats.
The new vulnerability indicator
During the past decade, the number of newly discovered vulnerabilities has steadily increased; of these, a growing proportion are no longer related to server software. The growing number of software packages that end users employ at workstations to conduct everyday business has attracted the attention of vulnerability researchers-who, from a security perspective, feel that the packages are poorly developed. The two most popular Web browsers alone have had a combined total of 152 security vulnerabilities since 1999 (see the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures dictionary at www.cve.mitre.org). Recent discoveries in software components used for image process- ing, 10,11 file compression, 12,13 digital media playback, 14 and file, email, and network encryption 15 provide additional clues about the increasing importance of security at workstations.
The exploit research indicator
From a motivated attacker's viewpoint, a successful attack on an organization involves compromising specific systems or otherwise achieving specific goals, such as obtaining confidential information or shutting down mission-critical servers. To perform directed attacks successfully, the attacker must overcome perimeter security mechanisms and server and application security controls with a set of tools. The most important of these tools-exploit programs-execute a known vulnerability condition and let the attacker subvert the exploited platform's security assumptions. Using highly reliable exploit programs is a key requirement for a determined attacker; therefore the small community of professional penetration testers and ethical or unethical hackers put great effort into devising new exploitation techniques and methodologies.
In the past few years, most of the published work on exploit research and development has revealed a high degree of sophistication in exploit programs and the use of techniques that closely resemble those of the virus writers and researchers in the early '80s. Reliable exploit code has become harder to develop, 16 which forces researchers to better understand operating systems' internals and application-layer security, as opposed to just focusing on network security. The mixed requirement of an in-depth technical understanding combined with attackers who are accustomed to targeted attacks (as compared to the generally undirected attacks in the virus threat model of the '80s) outlines requirements for a new breed of exploit programs targeted at workstation operating systems.
Use the front door, not the back door
The term "backdoor" is used to refer to a hole in a security system deliberately left in place by the designers or maintainers (www.jargon.8hz.com/jargon_17.html# SEC24). The concept of using the legitimate (but rarely used by outsiders) network access points to gain control of an organization's most valuable assets (the "front door" as opposed to an obscure "back door") was brought to my attention by coworkers Luciano Notarfrancesco and Gerardo Richarte.
The workstation is naturally both the outlet for an organization's most sensitive information and the most legitimate network component to access its IT assets. This makes the workstation the most obvious point of attack for a determined attacker, provided that he or she can gather intelligence on workstation technology and configuration and users' usage patterns and procedures.
The most sensitive components of any organization's security infrastructure are the CEO's, CFO's, or even the Chief Security Officer's or network administrator's workstations because they provide a direct path to controlling the organization and its assets. From this perspective, we can easily imagine workstation users as the target of hackers' intelligence-gathering attacks that attempt to determine login times, email and Internet browsing habits, personal and professional interests, and any other detailed information that will help them compromise the user's workstation and use it as an entry point to gain access to the internal network.
T he increasing interest in workstation security solutions such as personal firewalls, host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems, workstation access control software, file integrity checkers, and patch management systems might provide additional support to accept our hypothesis that the workstation is the weakest link. But if we choose to do so, we must come to grips with reality: humans operate and control workstations, and no technological gadget alone will strengthen the weakest link if human and organizational behaviors are not factored into a comprehensive security strategy.
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